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Abstract
Problem definition: We consider a retailer selling a single product to consumers through
an offline (brick-and-mortar) channel and an online channel. The consumers in each channel
are heterogeneous such that the product fits the tastes of only a fraction of these consumers.
The retailer provides a product description for each channel to help the consumers assess
whether the product fits their tastes. The retailer either operates the two channels separately
with different product description levels or integrates them with a common product descrip-
tion level. We also consider a review system where the consumers may post their reviews
after purchasing the product. The fraction of positive reviews will influence the purchase
intention of the future consumers. Our goal is to determine the retailer’s optimal strategy
to manage product descriptions and consumer reviews in this multi-channel environment.
Academic/practical relevance: To provide consumers a seamless shopping experience,
retailers begin to integrate their offline and online channels. Our research identifies condi-
tions under which integrating the offline and online channels benefits the retailers.
Methodology: We construct a two-period game-theoretical model in which the retailer
optimizes the product description levels to maximize her expected profit. Upon observing
the product descriptions, the consumers make purchase decisions to maximize their utility.
Results and managerial implications: We find that integrating the offline and online
channels generates more profit for the retailer if and only if the offline channel’s product
description limit and the consumers’ base product valuation are small. In the presence of
consumer reviews, even if the offline product description limit is large, it can still be more
profitable for the retailer to integrate the two channels. Furthermore, the consumer reviews
may reduce the retailer’s profit if the consumers’ base product valuation is sufficiently large.
Key words: Omni-channel retailing, Integration, Product descriptions, Consumer reviews,
Game theory
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1 Introduction
During the past decades, many retailers have supplemented their brick-and-mortar (offline)
stores with an online channel. Conventionally, these retailers operate their offline and online
channels separately, for example, in terms of human resource, inventory, product information,
etc. To provide consumers a seamless shopping experience across the offline and online channels,
some retailers begin to adopt an omni-channel strategy that employs new technology to integrate
the two channels (Cisco Study, 2013).
For some product categories such as apparel, consumers’ purchase decisions are affected
by their trials of the products in brick-and-mortar stores. However, for many other product
categories such as electronics, cosmetics, drugs, food, and books, consumers may not be able to
thoroughly try the products before purchases. Thus, for these product categories, the consumers’
purchase decisions largely depend on product descriptions. For example, it is difficult to judge a
digital camera’s versatility in handling different lighting conditions without extensive use of the
product. Such information, however, is usually provided in product descriptions. According to
the literature (see, for example, Gu and Xie (2013) and Sun and Tyagi (2017)), a consumer’s
purchase decision depends on how well a product’s attributes fit the consumer’s personal taste.
For many product categories, it is difficult for consumers to assess a product’s attributes even if
the product can be inspected physically. In contrast, a more comprehensive product description
can reduce the uncertainty of product fit, which affects the consumers’ purchase decisions. We
focus on such product categories in this paper.
While the online channel can offer virtually unlimited space to describe a product (Berman
and Thelen, 2004), a detailed product description is usually lacking in the offline channel.
According to a survey by Digimarc Corporation (2015), 85% of U.S. adult shoppers indicated
that their in-store purchase decisions were influenced by the descriptive information on product
packages. However, 78% of them mentioned that they did not find sufficient information that
they required. This reflects the limitation of the product descriptions in the offline channel.
If the offline and online channels are operated separately, then it is hard to resolve the offline
consumers’ product-fit uncertainty because of the product description limitation (Mayzlin and
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Shin, 2011). Meanwhile, many consumers expect offline stores to provide the same product
descriptions as their online counterparts, and 71% of them prefer in-store access to digital
contents (Cisco Study, 2013).
Nowadays, with the advance in information technology, some retailers are able to dissem-
inate a product description to both the offline and online consumers seamlessly, overcoming
the product description limitation in the offline channel. For example, the Chinese e-commerce
giant, Alibaba has proposed a “smart store” concept recently. In a smart store, offline con-
sumers can access additional product descriptions about sizes, colors, and functions from an
online channel through a “cloud shelf”, which is a digital interactive wall screen (Chen, 2017,
Dudarenok, 2018). Maserati has transformed two of its dealers in China into smart stores, where
customers can scan different parts of a car to learn about its features (Chou, 2018). Similarly,
the beauty and body-care retailer, Sephora encourages in-store customers to scan products us-
ing Sephora’s mobile app to access additional product descriptions (Lawson, 2016). The Indian
e-commerce platform, Paytm Mall collaborates with a fashion brand, Redtape to enable QR
codes for their entire offline catalogue. When offline consumers scan a QR code, they receive a
product description from an online platform (Nair, 2018, Rai, 2018).
By integrating the offline and online channels with such technologies, a retailer is able to
provide a more detailed product description to her offline consumers, reducing their product-fit
uncertainty. However, the retailer delivers the same product description through both the offline
and online channels, albeit the consumers’ decisions may be different across the two channels.
For example, if a consumer decides not to purchase a product from the retailer, then he can visit
another retailer. Switching to another retailer usually incurs a larger hassle cost for the offline
consumers (Balasubramanian, 1998, Forman et al., 2009, Mehra et al., 2017). This is because the
cost of searching and transportation for an offline consumer to visit another brick-and-mortar
store is higher than the cost of switching to another website for an online consumer. In this
case, integrating the offline and online channels causes inflexibility that prevents the retailer to
take advantage of the difference between her offline and online consumers’ decisions. Thus, it
is not clear whether adopting new technologies to integrate the offline and online channels to
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provide consistent product descriptions can always benefit the retailer.
The Internet and information technology also provide an opportunity for consumers to share
their reviews online after purchasing a product. Consumer reviews can be influential on the
future consumers’ purchase decisions (Chen and Xie, 2008). Among all the ratings and reviews,
the reviews that are endogenously generated by the consumers on retailers’ websites are the most
influential on the consumers’ purchase decisions (Cisco Study, 2013). It is known that positive
reviews can increase the consumers’ intention to purchase a product (Bickart and Schindler,
2001, Shaffer and Zettelmeyer, 2002, Huang and Chen, 2006, Park et al., 2007). However,
whether a consumer will post a positive review depends on his experience of the product (Li
and Hitt, 2008, Moe and Trusov, 2011). Generally, the review will be positive if the product
fits the consumer’s taste. The consumer can find out whether the product fits his taste from
the product description. Thus, the product description will affect the consumer reviews, which
in turn will affect the retailer’s sales.
Given that most consumer review systems are available only online, a retailer who operates
the offline and online channels separately is typically unable to deliver consumer reviews to the
offline consumers. However, the technology integrating the two channels allows both the offline
and online consumers to access the same consumer reviews (in addition to a consistent product
description). For example, in the Alibaba smart stores, consumers can read reviews through the
cloud shelf (Chen, 2017, Dudarenok, 2018). In Sephora offline stores, consumers can also read
reviews by scanning a product using a Sephora’s mobile app. Thus, introducing a consumer
review system not only complicates a retailer’s product-description decision, but also increases
her challenge to choose a more profitable channel-management strategy (that is, whether or not
to integrate the offline and online channels).
The above observations motivate the following research questions: (i) Under what conditions
should a retailer integrate her offline and online channels? (ii) Will consumer reviews make
integrating the two channels more favorable? (iii) Will the consumer reviews increase the
retailer’s profit? To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to optimize product descriptions
with endogenously generated consumer reviews in a multi-channel retail setting.
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To address the above questions, we consider a retailer selling a single product to consumers
through an offline channel and an online channel. The consumers in each channel are hetero-
geneous such that the product fits the tastes of only a fraction of these consumers. We assume
the offline and online channels have different outside options. We construct a two-period game-
theoretical model to study the retailer’s decision-making process. If the retailer operates the
two channels separately, she optimizes a product description level for each individual channel.
In contrast, if the retailer integrates the two channels, she optimizes a common product descrip-
tion level for both channels. In each period, the retailer first determines the product description
level(s). Upon observing the product description, each consumer updates his belief about the
product fit and makes a purchase decision to maximize his expected utility. After the consumers
make their purchase decisions, the profit of the retailer is realized. We further consider that if a
consumer review system is available, the consumers who purchase the product in period 1 may
post their reviews on the system. The fraction of positive reviews will influence the purchasing
intention of the upcoming consumers in period 2.
We have obtained the following insights:
(i) Without consumer reviews, we find that it is more profitable for the retailer to inte-
grate the offline and online channels if and only if the offline product description limit and the
consumers’ base product valuation are small. This is because if the two channels are operated
separately, the offline consumers are unlikely to purchase the product given the high product-fit
uncertainty. In contrast, integrating the offline and online product descriptions makes more
offline consumers willing to purchase the product, generating more profit for the retailer. How-
ever, if the base product valuation is sufficiently large, it is more profitable for the retailer to
operate the two channels separately by differentiating their product description levels.
(ii) In the presence of consumer reviews, even if the offline product description limit is large,
it can still be more profitable for the retailer to integrate the two channels. This is because
the integration allows the offline consumers to post and read the reviews. The retailer provides
a rich product description in the first period to generate a large fraction of positive reviews,
which in turn raise the offline consumers’ purchasing intention in the second period, increasing
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the retailer’s profit. However, since the retailer sets the same product description level for
both channels, the higher product description level in the first period can deter some offline
consumers whom the product does not fit from purchasing the product. If the profit gain from
the upcoming consumers in the second period can compensate this profit loss in the first period,
then it is more profitable to integrate the offline and online channels.
(iii) Consumer reviews may reduce the retailer’s profit if the consumers’ base product valu-
ation is sufficiently large. In this situation, without consumer reviews, the retailer can already
easily attract the consumers with a low product description level. However, in the presence
of consumer reviews, the retailer has to set a high product description level in the first period
to avoid negative reviews. This prevents some consumers whom the product does not fit from
purchasing the product in the first period, driving down the retailer’s profit.
This paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the relevant literature in §2, we analyze
the models without and with consumer reviews in §3 and §4 respectively. We consider an
extended model in §5 where offline consumers may search for the online product description
even if the retailer does not facilitate that. §6 concludes the paper. All proofs are provided in
the online supplement.
2 Literature review
We consider a retailer that operates an offline channel and an online channel separately with
different product description levels or integrates the two channels with a common product
description level. In contrast, a stream of literature on traditional channel management studies
different channels operated by different companies. See, for example, Chiang et al. (2003),
Cattani et al. (2006), Chen et al. (2008), and Netessine and Rudi (2006). Our work is also
related to Bernstein et al. (2008), who consider bricks-and-mortar retailers opening their online
channels in an oligopoly setting.
There is growing literature on omni-channel retail management. Most operations manage-
ment papers in this area focus on fulfillment. Gallino and Moreno (2014) empirically test the
impact of the practice of buy-online, pick-up-in-store (BOPS) on a retailer’s sales in both online
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and offline channels. Gao and Su (2017) study the implications of BOPS on channel coordi-
nation based on an analytical model. Gallino et al. (2017) investigate another omni-channel
fulfillment strategy – ship to store. They empirically demonstrate that within a group of stock-
keeping units, the strategy increases the sales of bottom-selling items. Lim et al. (2016) describe
last-mile supply network configurations in omni-channel retailing. Harsha et al. (2019) propose
two pricing policies for an omni-channel retailer in the presence of cross-channel fulfillment.
A few papers study how to effectively provide information to consumers in an omni-channel
environment. Bell et al. (2017) investigate the impact of physical showrooms on consumers’
channel choice. Gao and Su (2017) study the individual as well as the joint impacts of physical
showrooms, virtual showrooms, and inventory-availability information on consumer behavior
and retail operational efficiency. Gao et al. (2018) investigate how an online channel influences a
retailer’s decisions regarding physical stores, where customers can inspect products. In contrast,
our paper considers product descriptions and consumer reviews. The former helps consumers
assess whether a product fits their tastes, whereas the latter can influence the future consumers’
purchase decisions. We study how a retailer strategically provide the product descriptions in
different channels with and without consumer reviews. We identify conditions in which the
retailer is better off by integrating the offline and online channels.
Our paper is also related to the literature on how a firm can induce purchases from consumers
facing product value and fit uncertainty. Gu and Xie (2013) examine firms’ equilibrium fit-
revelation decisions in a competitive market. Ofek et al. (2011) focus on the impact of adding
an online channel on a retailer’s pricing and fit-revelation decisions. Kwark et al. (2014) and
Sun and Tyagi (2017) examine the disclosure of product-fit information in the context of a
distribution channel. Liu et al. (2019) investigates the optimal information provision strategy
to resolve uncertainty in the presence of consumer search costs. Different from these papers, our
study focuses on the retailer’s decisions on the product descriptions under two different channel-
management strategies: operating the offline and online channels separately or integrating them.
This paper also adds to the literature that studies consumer reviews. Chen and Xie (2008)
study how to adjust a retailer’s marketing communication strategy in response to consumer
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reviews. They identify when the retailer benefits from facilitating the consumer reviews. Yu
et al. (2016) examine the impact of consumer reviews on a firm’s dynamic pricing strategy in
the presence of strategic consumers. Liu et al. (2017) study how online reviews and past-sales-
volume information jointly affect consumer purchase decisions and firms’ pricing strategies. In
contrast, our paper investigates how consumer reviews affect a retailer’s decisions on the product
descriptions and her incentive to integrate the offline and online channels.
3 Model without consumer reviews
3.1 Model description
We consider a retailer that sells a single product through an offline (brick-and-mortar) channel
and an online channel to consumers in two periods t = 1, 2. Let i = b, o denote the offline
and online channels respectively. For each channel, we assume there are n distinct consumers
in each period. For simplicity, we assume the retail price of the product is fixed at p for both
channels and for both periods.
The product is characterized by several attributes related to its design and functionality.
For example, the attributes that characterize a digital camera are its size, weight, sensor, im-
age processor, AF points, ISO range, etc. The consumers are heterogeneous in their tastes
(preferences) for each product attribute. We assume that each consumer knows his own taste
for each attribute, but the actual details of the attribute of the product are unknown to him.
Therefore, before purchasing the product, the consumer is unsure about whether each product
attribute matches his expectation. We say the product fits a consumer if all its attributes
fit the consumer’s taste. Otherwise, the product does not fit the consumer. Let m = 0 de-
note a scenario where the product fits the consumer and assume this occurs with a probability
P{m = 0} = θ ∈ (0, 1) in each period. Let m = 1 denote a scenario where the product does
not fit a consumer and assume this occurs with a probability P{m = 1} = 1− θ in each period.
Given the definition of m, each consumer’s valuation of the product is V − cm, where V rep-
resents base product valuation and c > 0 captures a valuation reduction due to product misfit.
Note that for the sake of tractability, we neglect the difference between a misfit caused by a
8
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3501364
single attribute and a misfit caused by multiple attributes.
In each period t = 1, 2, the retailer decides on the product description level di,t ∈ [0, 1] for
channel i = b, o. The product description level di,t represents the amount of information of the
product’s attributes disclosed to the consumers. This information helps the consumers resolve
the uncertainty of m. A larger di,t corresponds to a more informative product description for
channel i in period t. Similar to a common approach in the literature (see, for example, Lewis
and Sappington (1994), Chen and Xie (2008), and Kwark et al. (2014)), we assume that after
knowing di,t, a private signal s is generated for each consumer. Specifically, after the consumer
reads the product description in channel i, if this description suggests that the product fits
the consumer, then s = 0. Otherwise, we have s = 1. If the product actually does not fit
the consumer (m = 1), the signal s is more likely to reveal the misfit (s is more likely to
appear as 1) as more information about the product’s attributes is provided. Thus, we have
P{s = 1|m = 1} = di,t and P{s = 0|m = 1} = 1 − di,t, for i = b, o and t = 1, 2. On the other
hand, if the product actually fits the consumer (m = 0), then all its attributes fit the consumer’s
taste. In this case, the signal s will not reveal any misfit (s will appear as 0) regardless of the
product description level di,t. That is, P{s = 0|m = 0} = 1.
Let U denote each consumer’s utility of purchasing the product from the retailer. Given the
signal s and using the above probabilities, we can derive each consumer’s conditional expected
utility of purchasing the product as E[U |s] = V − cE[m|s] − p, where E[m|s] represents the
expected degree of misfit given s. According to Bayes’ Theorem (Stuart and Ord, 1994), we have
E[m|s = 0] = (1−θ)(1−di,t)1−(1−θ)di,t and E[m|s = 1] = 1. Based on the above results, we can derive each
consumer’s conditional expected utility in channel i for each period t as
E[U |s = 0] = V − cE[m|s = 0]− p = V − c(1−θ)(1−di,t)1−(1−θ)di,t − p,
E[U |s = 1] = V − cE[m|s = 1]− p = V − c− p. (1)
Each consumer in channel i decides whether to purchase the product from the retailer by
comparing his conditional expected utility in Equations (1) with an outside option. Note that we
assume that if a consumer decides not to purchase the product from the retailer through channel
i, then his outside option is to visit and purchase it from another retailer. Let ui denote the
consumer’s utility from the outside option of channel i. We assume uo > ub because switching to
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an outside option usually incurs a larger hassle cost to the offline consumers (Balasubramanian,
1998, Forman et al., 2009, Mehra et al., 2017) as mentioned in §1. Furthermore, to exclude
uninteresting cases in which the consumers make purchases for any product description level
or always purchase from only one channel, we assume p + uo ≤ V < p + ub + (1 − θ)c and
(1− θ)c/2 < uo − ub < min{θc, (1− θ)c}.
Let φi,t(d) denote the probability of each consumer in channel i to purchase the product
in period t given a product description level d. The retailer’s expected profit from channel i
in period t is denoted as pii,t(di,t) = p × n × φi,t(di,t), for i = b, o and t = 1, 2. We assume
that providing a product description incurs a fixed cost that is independent of the product
description level di,t, and we normalize it to zero in our analysis. This is reasonable in practice
because the extra cost of adding a few more lines of text about the product is often negligible.
To refine the equilibrium, we assume that if pii,t(d
′
i,t) = pii,t(d
′′
i,t) and d
′
i,t < d
′′
i,t, then the retailer
always chooses d′i,t.
The retailer can operate the offline and online channels separately, or integrate the two
channels. Depending on the retailer’s channel-management strategy, the retailer makes dif-
ferent decisions to maximize her total expected profit. Specifically, a retailer who operates
two channels separately chooses db,t to maximize pib,t and chooses do,t to maximize pio,t, result-
ing in a total expected profit pidual,t = pib,t + pio,t. To capture the offline channel’s limitation
in the product description, we assume that db,t ≤ d¯, where d¯ ∈ (0, 1). In contrast, with
the technology mentioned in §1, a retailer who integrates the offline and online channels does
not face such a limitation in her offline channel. Instead, the retailer chooses an identical
product description level domni,t for the two channels to maximize her total expected profit
piomni,t = p× (n× φb,t(domni,t) + n× φo,t(domni,t)).
In each period t, the retailer first decides the product description level for each channel to
maximize her total expected profit. After reading the product description, a private signal s is
generated for each consumer in channel i according to the probability P{s|m}. The consumer
then decides whether to purchase the product by comparing his conditional expected utility
E[U |s] with the outside option of channel i. Figure 1 shows the sequence of the decisions in the
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two periods.
Retailer
Decides the product
description level
for each channel
Signals in period
1 are generated
Consumers
Decide whether
to purchase
the product
Retailer
Decides the product
description level
for each channel
Signals in period
2 are generated
Consumers
Decide whether
to purchase
the product
period 1 period 2
Figure 1: The sequence of decisions in the two periods without consumer reviews
We first determine the optimal decisions of the retailer when she operates the offline and
online channels separately in §3.2, before we find the optimal decisions of the retailer when
she integrates the offline and online channels in §3.3. Note that in the absence of consumer
reviews, the optimal decisions are the same across the two periods and we use a superscript (∗)
to denote all the optimal decisions and the equilibrium outcomes. We identify conditions under
which integrating the offline and online channels benefits the retailer. Although the decisions
are the same across the periods, it is worth considering the two-period model here so that we
can compare it with a model with consumer reviews, in which the decisions are different across
the periods.
3.2 Operating offline and online channels separately
We first analyze the retailer’s optimal decisions for the offline channel and then for the online
channel. In the offline channel, the retailer chooses db,t ≤ d¯ to maximize her expected profit pib,t
in each period t. Lemma 1 shows the optimal decisions of the retailer for the offline channel.
Let dˆ = (1−θ)c−(uo−ub)(1−θ)[c−(uo−ub)] and Vˆ = p+ ub +
(1−θ)(1−d¯)c
1−(1−θ)d¯ .
Lemma 1. The retailer sets a product description level d∗b,t = 0 for the offline channel with
an expected profit pi∗b,t = 0 if d¯ ≤ dˆ and V < Vˆ , and sets a product description level d∗b,t =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) with an expected profit pi
∗
b,t =
θnpc
p−V+ub+c otherwise, for t = 1, 2.
For the online channel, the retailer can choose any do,t ∈ [0, 1] to maximize her expected
profit pio,t in each period t. Lemma 2 shows the retailer’s optimal decisions.
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Lemma 2. The retailer sets a product description level d∗o,t =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) for the
online channel with an expected profit pi∗o,t =
θnpc
p−V+uo+c , for t = 1, 2.
Lemma 1 shows that if the product description limit for the offline channel is low and
the consumers’ base product valuation is small, then the retailer provides a minimum product
description for the offline channel. Since the base product valuation is small, the consumers
will not purchase the product if their fit uncertainty is high. The retailer cannot resolve the
consumers’ fit uncertainty even with the highest level of product description. Therefore, the
retailer would rather not sell through the offline channel. In contrast, Lemma 2 shows that the
retailer can always induce her online channel’s consumers to purchase the product, and make a
profit by optimizing the product description level.
3.3 Integrating offline and online channels
The retailer sets a common product description level domni,t for the offline and online channels
to maximize her total expected profit piomni,t in each period t. Lemma 3 shows the optimal
decisions of the retailer.
Lemma 3. The retailer sets a product description level d∗omni,t =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) for both
the offline and online channels with a total expected profit pi∗omni,t =
2θnpc
p−V+uo+c , for t = 1, 2.
By comparing Lemmas 3 and 1, we observe that for the offline channel, the retailer provides a
more detailed product description when the offline and online channels are integrated than that
when the two channels are operated separately (that is, d∗omni,t > d
∗
b,t). This can be achieved
by enabling the offline consumers to access the online product description with the technology
mentioned in §1.
3.4 Comparing the two strategies
By comparing the retailer’s total expected profits under the two strategies in §3.2 and §3.3,
we identify conditions under which integrating the offline and online channels yields a higher
expected profit for the retailer.
12
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Theorem 1. The retailer is more profitable by integrating the offline and online channels if
and only if d¯ ≤ dˆ and V < Vˆ .
Figure 2 illustrates whether integrating the offline and online channels is beneficial for the
retailer under different values of d¯ and V . It is intuitive that integrating the two channels is
more profitable if d¯ is small. This is because the integration removes the product description
limit from the offline channel, and induces the consumers who are deterred by an insufficient
product description to make purchases.
d¯
V
0 dˆ 1
p+ uo
p+ ub + (1− θ)c
Not beneficial
Beneficial
Figure 2: Region in which integrating the offline and online channels benefits the retailer
Figure 2 shows that, contrary to a common belief that integrating the offline and online
channels is more beneficial, operating the two channels separately turns out to be more profitable
if V is sufficiently large. This is because when the base product valuation is large, it is easier
to attract the offline consumers whose utility from the outside option is low.
To take advantage of this, the retailer should differentiate the product description levels for
the two channels to maximize her profit. Specifically, the retailer should set a lower product
description level for the offline channel (than the online channel) because the outside option
there is less attractive. In contrast, the retailer does not have this flexibility if the two channels
are integrated. Furthermore, a higher product description level for the offline channel (recall
that d∗omni,t > d
∗
b,t) will increase the number of offline consumers who think the product does
not fit them and will not purchase the product. When V is large, this effect dominates the
benefit of integrating the two channels, hurting the retailer’s profitability.
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4 Model with consumer reviews
4.1 Model description
In this section, we assume that the consumers who purchase the product in period 1 can post
their reviews about the product through a review system. The consumers in period 2 can read
these reviews before they decide whether to purchase the product. To align with the practice
that consumer reviews are typically posted online, we assume that if the retailer operates the
offline and online channels separately, only the online consumers can post and read the reviews,
whereas both the offline and online consumers can post and read the reviews if the retailer
integrates the two channels. We study the equilibrium outcomes and the implications of adding
such a consumer review system.
Given the retailer’s decision on the product descriptions and the generated private signals,
the conditional expected utility and the purchase decision of each consumer in period 1 are the
same as in the model without consumer reviews in §3. After a consumer purchases the product
in period 1, he learns that whether the product fits him or not (that is, m is realized). The
consumer will post a review with a probability η ∈ [0, 1]. Based on a common assumption in the
literature of product reviews (Li and Hitt, 2008, Moe and Trusov, 2011), the consumer’s review
can be either positive or negative, depending on whether the product fits him. Specifically, if
his realized utility from purchasing the product is no less than that from the outside option
(that is, if U = V − cm−p ≥ ui), then the consumer will write a positive review. Otherwise, he
will write a negative review. Note that this approach is commonly used in modeling consumer
reviews (Ifrach et al., 2015).
For the consumers in period 2, the positive reviews generated in period 1 increase their
perceived value of the product (Bickart and Schindler, 2001, Shaffer and Zettelmeyer, 2002,
Huang and Chen, 2006, Park et al., 2007). Let λ denote the fraction of positive reviews among
all the consumer reviews generated in period 1. Let λ denote a threshold value above which λ
has a positive effect on each consumer’s valuation of the product in period 2, which is defined as
V − cm+ψ(λ), where ψ(λ) ≡ a(λ− λ) captures the impact of the consumer reviews. In period
2, the conditional expected utility of each consumer in channel i from purchasing the product
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can be derived as follows:
E[U |s = 0] = V − cE[m|s = 0] + ψ(λ)− p = V − c(1−θ)(1−di,2)1−(1−θ)di,2 + ψ(λ)− p,
E[U |s = 1] = V − cE[m|s = 1] + ψ(λ)− p = V − c+ ψ(λ)− p. (2)
The outside option of each channel i stays unchanged. Each consumer in channel i decides
whether to purchase the product by comparing his conditional expected utility in Equations (2)
with the outside option of the channel.
Note that in Equations (2), the fraction of positive reviews (λ) only affects the consumers’
valuation of the product but cannot help them to determine whether the product fits them.
This is suitable when the consumer reviews are expressed as thumbs up or down, or star ratings,
which do not carry the information to resolve the uncertainty of product fit (Hu et al., 2006).
A model that incorporates a more comprehensive review system providing the information
about product fit is, unfortunately, intractable in our setting. Furthermore, we assume that
θ+ (1−θ)ca < λ < 1− (1−θ)ca and a > 2c/θ2 to exclude trivial cases in which the consumer reviews
have no impact or a single-sided (only positive or negative) impact on the equilibrium outcomes.
Similar to the model without consumer reviews, in each period t, if the offline and online
channels are operated separately, the retailer determines the product description level di,t for
each channel i, but if the two channels are integrated, the retailer determines a common product
description level domni,t for both channels. The sequence of the decisions is similar to that of the
model without consumer reviews in Figure 1, except that in period 1, the retailer chooses the
product description level for each channel to maximize her total expected profit over the two
periods. Figure 3 shows the sequence of the decisions in the two periods. We solve the optimal
decisions of the retailer and the consumers through backward induction to obtain the perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.
We determine the optimal decisions and the equilibrium outcomes if the offline and online
channels are operated separately in §4.2 and if the two channels are integrated in §4.3. We use a
superscript (†) to denote all the optimal decisions and the equilibrium outcomes in the presence
of consumer reviews. We identify conditions under which the consumer review system and the
integration of the offline and online channels benefit the retailer.
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Decides the product
description level
for each channel
Signals in period
1 are generated
Consumers
Decide whether
to purchase
the product
Consumers
who
purchase
Write
reviews
with a
probability
Retailer
Decides the product
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for each channel
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Decide whether
to purchase
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period 1 period 2
Figure 3: The sequence of decisions in the two periods with consumer reviews
4.2 Operating offline and online channels separately
If the retailer operates the offline and online channels separately, only the online consumers
can post and read the reviews. Thus, the offline consumers have the same conditional expected
utilities and optimal decisions as in the model without consumer reviews in §3.2. Thus, the
retailer’s optimal decision d†b,t for the offline channel is identical to d
∗
b,t in Lemma 1.
For the online channel, we determine the retailer’s optimal decisions backward by first finding
d†o,2 in period 2, before we find d
†
o,1 in period 1. The retailer takes the consumer reviews in period
1 into account, and chooses a product description level do,2 for the online channel in period 2
to maximize her expected profit pio,2(do,2) = p × n × φo,2(do,2). Recall that ψ(λ) = a(λ − λ)
represents the impact of consumer reviews.
Lemma 4. In the presence of consumer reviews, the retailer sets a product description level
d†o,2 with an expected profit pi
†
o,2 in period 2 for the online channel as follows.
1. d†o,2 = 0 and pi
†
o,2 = 0 if
(a) ψ(λ) ≤ uo − ub − (1− θ)c, or
(b) uo − ub − (1− θ)c < ψ(λ) < 0 and V < p+ uo − ψ(λ).
2. d†o,2 =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V+ψ(λ)−p−uo−c) and pi
†
o,2 =
θnpc
p−V+uo+c−ψ(λ) if
(a) uo − ub − (1− θ)c < ψ(λ) < 0 and V ≥ p+ uo − ψ(λ), or
(b) 0 ≤ ψ(λ) ≤ uo − ub, or
(c) uo − ub < ψ(λ) < (1− θ)c and V < p+ uo + (1− θ)c− ψ(λ).
3. d†o,2 = 0 and pi
†
o,2 = pn if
(a) uo − ub < ψ(λ) < (1− θ)c and V ≥ p+ uo + (1− θ)c− ψ(λ), or
(b) ψ(λ) ≥ (1− θ)c.
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Figure 4 shows the retailer’s optimal decision d†o,2 for the online channel in period 2 under
different values of ψ(λ) and V . For Case 1 where ψ(λ) < 0 and V is small, the reviews have a
negative impact on the consumers’ product valuation in period 2, it is optimal for the retailer
to set a minimum product description level (d†o,2 = 0). In this case, the consumers in period 2
will not purchase the product even if the retailer provides the maximum product description.
Thus, the retailer sets d†o,2 = 0.
ψ(λ)
V
0 (1− θ)c
p+ uo
p+ ub + (1− θ)c
Case 1
d†o,2 = 0
Case 2
d†o,2 > 0
Case 3
d†o,2 = 0
Figure 4: The retailer’s optimal decision d†o,2 for the online channel in period 2
For Case 2 where the reviews have a negative impact on the consumers’ product valuation in
period 2 but V is large, or the reviews have a moderate positive impact, the retailer can induce
the consumers to purchase the product by choosing a positive product description level. For
Case 3 where the reviews have a strong positive impact on the consumers’ product valuation,
the retailer can induce all the consumers in period 2 to purchase the product even if she provides
a minimum product description.
By comparing Lemma 4 and Lemma 2 (without consumer reviews), we have the following
findings. (i) While the retailer always makes a profit in the absence of reviews, she may not
make any profit from the online channel in the presence of reviews. For example, in Case 1 of
Lemma 4 where the reviews have a negative impact on the consumers’ product valuation and
V is small, the retailer earns no profit and she is hurt by the consumer review system. (ii)
While the retailer always sets a positive product description level in the absence of reviews, she
may choose to provide no product description for the online channel in the presence of reviews.
For example, in Case 3 of Lemma 4 where the reviews have a strong positive impact on the
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consumers’ product valuation, the retailer can make a higher profit. In this case, the consumer
review system benefits the retailer.
In period 1, the retailer chooses a product description level do,1 for the online channel to
maximize her total expected profit Πo = pio,1+pio,2 over the two periods. Let λ¯ = θ+
(uo−ub)(a−c)
ac
and V¯1 = p+ uo + (1− θ)c− ca(λ−θ)a−c .
Lemma 5. In the presence of consumer reviews, the retailer sets a product description level
d†o,1 with a total expected profit Π
†
o over the two periods for the online channel as follows.
1. d†o,1 =
1
1−θ +
θa
(1−θ)(V−p−aλ−uo−(1−θ)c) and Π
†
o =
θnpa
p−V+aλ+uo+(1−θ)c + pn if λ ≥ λ¯ and
V ≥ V¯1.
2. d†o,1 =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) and Π
†
o =
θnpc
p−V+uo+c + pn otherwise.
The proof of Lemma 5 shows that the retailer sets a high product description level in period
1 to reduce the number of negative reviews from the consumers whom the product does not
fit. This is because, after reading a more detailed product description, the consumers whom
the product does not fit (with m = 1) are more likely to find out the misfit (s = 1) and they
will neither purchase the product nor write a review. Therefore, the retailer is able to generate
a large fraction of positive reviews λ such that ψ(λ) has a positive impact on the consumers’
product valuation in period 2.
Comparing Lemma 5 with Lemma 2, if the consumers are very sensitive to the negative
reviews and have large base product valuation (that is, λ ≥ λ¯ and V ≥ V¯1), then we have
d†o,1 > d
∗
o,1. This means the retailer needs to provide a more detailed product description in
the presence of reviews. This is because, without a sufficiently large λ, the reviews will hurt
the consumers’ product valuation in period 2 (ψ(λ) is negative), making it difficult to sell the
product even if V is large. Therefore, to make λ sufficiently large, the retailer needs a higher
product description level d†o,1 to reduce the number of consumers, whom the product does not
fit, to purchase the product and write negative reviews.
To find out the impact of the consumer reviews on retailer, we compare the retailer’s total ex-
pected profits Π∗o and Π
†
o and the corresponding optimal decisions d∗o,1 and d
†
o,1 without and with
the consumer reviews respectively. Let V¯2 = p+uo+(1−θ)c− θc−a(θ+λ)+
√
(a(θ+λ)−θc)2+4θca(λ−θ)
2 .
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Theorem 2. The consumer review system has the following impact on the retailer.
1. If λ < λ¯, or λ ≥ λ¯ and V < V¯1, then the consumer review system benefits the retailer
(Π†o > Π∗o) and it does not affect the product description level in period 1 (d
†
o,1 = d
∗
o,1).
2. If λ ≥ λ¯ and V¯1 ≤ V < V¯2, then the consumer review system benefits the retailer (Π†o > Π∗o)
and it increases the product description level in period 1 (d†o,1 > d
∗
o,1).
3. If λ ≥ λ¯ and V ≥ V¯2, then the consumer review system hurts the retailer (Π†o < Π∗o) and
it increases the product description level in period 1 (d†o,1 > d
∗
o,1).
Adding the consumer review system benefits the retailer (that is, Π†o > Π∗o) except when
both λ and V are large. There are three cases in Theorem 2. First, if the consumers are
not very sensitive to negative reviews (that is, λ < λ¯), then the reviews are likely to have
a positive impact on the consumers’ product valuation in period 2. In this case, adding the
consumer review system increases the retailer’s profit in period 2 without affecting the product
description level (d†o,1 = d
∗
o,1) and the expected profit in period 1. As a result, the retailer’s
total expected profit over the two periods increases after adding the consumer review system
(that is, Π†o > Π∗o).
If λ is large but V is sufficiently small (λ ≥ λ¯ and V < V¯1), then, even without reviews,
the retailer already needs to set a high product description level to help the consumers resolve
product-fit uncertainty and to induce them to purchase the product (because the conditional
expected utility in Equation (1) increases with do,1). Adding the consumer review system does
not affect the product description level in period 1 (that is, d†o,1 = d
∗
o,1). This is because the
high product description level can already deter the consumers, whom the product does not fit,
to purchase the product in period 1. This leads to a large fraction of positive reviews λ and
generates a larger expected profit for the retailer in period 2. Thus, we have Π†o > Π∗o.
Second, if λ is large and V is moderate (Case 2 of Theorem 2) then adding the consumer
review system increases the retailer’s total expected profit (that is, Π†o > Π∗o) and increases the
product description level in period 1 (that is, d†o,1 > d
∗
o,1). This is because a moderate V means
that there is a considerable number of consumers purchasing the product even without the
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consumer reviews. Thus, adding the consumer review system will benefit the retailer (Π†o > Π∗o)
only when λ is sufficiently large. To achieve that, the retailer needs to increase the product
description level in period 1 (d†o,1 > d
∗
o,1) to reduce the number of consumers whom the product
does not fit to make purchases and write negative reviews.
Lastly, adding the consumer review system hurts the retailer’s expected profit (that is,
Π†o < Π∗o) and increases the product description level in period 1 (that is, d
†
o,1 > d
∗
o,1), if λ
and V are both large (Case 3 of Theorem 2). In this case, V is sufficiently large that even
without the consumer reviews, the retailer can easily attract many consumers to purchase in
both periods with a low product description level. However, in the presence of reviews, the
retailer has to set a higher product description level in period 1 (d†o,1 > d
∗
o,1) to ensure a larger
λ such that the reviews will not negatively affect her profit in period 2. This increase in the
product description level drives down the retailer’s profit in period 1 because some consumers
will find out the product misfit and will not purchase the product. The profit gain in period 2
due to the positive reviews is insufficient to compensate the profit loss in period 1. Thus, the
retailer is worse off by having the consumer review system (Π†o < Π∗o).
Overall, Theorem 2 reveals that whether the consumer review system is beneficial to the
retailer depends on two important factors: the consumers’ sensitivity to negative reviews (λ)
and the consumers’ base product valuation (V ). Figure 5 illustrates the region in which adding
the consumer review system benefits the retailer.
λ
V
θ + (1−θ)ca
p+ uo
p+ ub + (1− θ)c Consumer
reviews do
not benefit
the retailer
Consumer
reviews benefit
the retailer
Figure 5: Adding the consumer review system may benefit the retailer
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4.3 Integrating offline and online channels
If the offline and online channels are integrated, the retailer sets the same product description
level domni,t for the two channels and enables the consumers in both channels to post and read
the reviews. To facilitate the offline consumers to provide their feedback, the retailer can enable
them to create online accounts so that they can post their reviews (Chen, 2017, Yang, 2018).
To allow the consumers to read the reviews conveniently in the offline stores, the retailer can
install the “cloud shelf.”
Taking into account of the consumer reviews, the retailer optimizes her decision domni,1 in
period 1 to maximize her total expected profit Πomni = piomni,1 + piomni,2 over the two periods,
and chooses domni,2 to maximize her expected profit piomni,2 in period 2. We determine the
retailer’s optimal decisions backward by first finding d†omni,2 in period 2, before we find d
†
omni,1
in period 1.
Lemma 6. In the presence of consumer reviews, the retailer sets a product description level
d†omni,2 with an expected profit pi
†
omni,2 in period 2 as follows.
1. d†omni,2 = 0 and pi
†
omni,2 = 0 if
(a) ψ(λ) ≤ −(1− θ)c, or
(b) −(1− θ)c < ψ(λ) < −(uo − ub) and V < p+ ub − ψ(λ).
2. d†omni,2 =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V+ψ(λ)−p−ub−c) and pi
†
omni,2 =
θnpc
p−V+ub+c−ψ(λ) if
(a) −(1− θ)c < ψ(λ) < −(uo − ub) and V ≥ p+ ub − ψ(λ), or
(b) −(uo − ub) ≤ ψ(λ) ≤ uo − ub − (1− θ)c, or
(c) uo − ub − (1− θ)c < ψ(λ) < 0 and V < p+ uo − ψ(λ).
3. d†omni,2 =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V+ψ(λ)−p−uo−c) and pi
†
omni,2 =
2θnpc
p−V+uo+c−ψ(λ) if
(a) uo − ub − (1− θ)c < ψ(λ) < 0 and V ≥ p+ uo − ψ(λ), or
(b) 0 ≤ ψ(λ) ≤ uo − ub, or
(c) uo − ub < ψ(λ) < (1− θ)c and V < p+ uo + (1− θ)c− ψ(λ).
4. d†omni,2 = 0 and pi
†
omni,2 = 2pn if
(a) uo − ub < ψ(λ) < (1− θ)c and V ≥ p+ uo + (1− θ)c− ψ(λ), or
(b) ψ(λ) ≥ (1− θ)c.
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According to Lemma 6, the retailer sets a minimum product description level d†omni,2 = 0 in
period 2, if the reviews have a strong negative (Case 1) or strong positive (Case 4) impact on
the product valuation. In Case 1, the reviews will significantly reduce the consumers’ product
valuation in period 2 so that no consumers will purchase the product even if the retailer provides
a maximum product description. Conversely, in Case 4, the reviews can significantly increase
the product valuation in period 2 such that all the consumers will purchase the product even if
the retailer provides a minimum product description.
The consumer reviews have a moderate impact in Cases 2 and 3. The retailer sets different
product description levels depending on ψ(λ) and V . Figure 6 shows the retailer’s optimal
decision d†omni,2 in period 2 for different values of ψ(λ) and V .
ψ(λ)
V
−(uo − ub) 0 (1− θ)c
p+ uo
p+ ub + (1− θ)c
Case 1
d†omni,2 = 0
Case 2
d†omni,2 > 0
Case 3
d†omni,2 > 0
Case 4
d†omni,2 = 0
Figure 6: The retailer’s optimal decision d†omni,2 in period 2
Comparing Figure 4 (the retailer’s optimal decision d†o,2 if the offline and online channels
are operated separately) with Figure 6, we observe that if ψ(λ) < 0, d†o,2 = 0 in Figure 4 but
d†omni,2 > 0 in Case 2 of Figure 6 . Due to the negative impact of the reviews (ψ(λ) < 0), if
the two channels are operated separately, the retailer cannot induce the online consumers to
purchase the product even if she provides a maximum product description. Thus, she chooses
a minimum product description for the online channel. In contrast, if the offline and online
channels are integrated, the retailer sets a positive product description level even if the reviews
have a negative impact (ψ(λ) < 0). Although she cannot generate sales from the online channel,
the retailer still can generate sales from the offline consumers whose outside option is less
attractive.
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Comparing Lemma 6 to Lemma 3 (the retailer’s optimal decision without consumer reviews),
we observe that d†omni,2 < d
∗
omni,2 in many cases. This suggests that the consumer reviews may
serve as an alternative device to induce purchases, while reducing the retailer’s dependence on
the product description.
The following lemma determines the retailer’s optimal decision in period 1. Recall that
λ¯ = θ + (uo−ub)(a−c)ac and V¯1 = p+ uo + (1− θ)c− ca(λ−θ)a−c .
Lemma 7. In the presence of consumer reviews, the retailer sets a product description level
d†omni,1 with a total expected profit Π
†
omni over the two periods as follows.
1. d†omni,1 =
1
1−θ +
θa
(1−θ)(V−p−aλ−uo−(1−θ)c) and Π
†
omni =
2θnpa
p−V+aλ+uo+(1−θ)c + 2np
if λ > λ¯ and V ≥ V¯1.
2. d†omni,1 =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) and Π
†
omni =
2θnpc
p−V+uo+c + 2np otherwise.
Similar to Lemma 5, the proof of Lemma 7 shows that, in response to the addition of the
consumer review system, the retailer will choose a high product description level in period 1
to generate a large fraction of positive reviews λ. Similar to Theorem 2 where the offline and
online channels are operated separately, Corollary 1 shows the condition under which adding
the consumer review system benefits the retailer if the offline and online channels are integrated.
Corollary 1. The consumer review system benefits the retailer (Π†omni > Π
∗
omni) except for both
λ and V are large.
4.4 Comparing the two strategies
In the presence of consumer reviews, if the two channels are operated separately, we can obtain
the retailer’s total expected profit over the two periods Π†dual = pi
∗
b,1 + pi
∗
b,2 + Π
†
o from Lemmas
1 and 5. Comparing Π†dual with Π
†
omni in Lemma 7, Theorem 3 identifies the conditions under
which integrating the offline and online channels yields a higher profit for the retailer. Let
λˆ = θ+ (uo−ub)(a−c)ac +
θ(1−θ)(a−c)cd¯
1−(1−θ)d¯ and V˜ = p+uo+(1−θ)c+
θc−(uo−ub)−
√
(θc−(uo−ub))2+8θc(uo−ub)
2 .
Recall that dˆ = (1−θ)c−(uo−ub)(1−θ)[c−(uo−ub)] and Vˆ = p+ ub +
(1−θ)(1−d¯)c
1−(1−θ)d¯ .
Theorem 3. In the presence of consumer reviews, we have the following results.
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1. If uo − ub > (1−θ)c1+θ , it is more profitable for the retailer to integrate the offline and online
channels if and only if d¯ ≤ dˆ and V < Vˆ .
2. If uo − ub ≤ (1−θ)c1+θ and λ > λˆ, it is more profitable for the retailer to integrate the offline
and online channels if and only if d¯ ≤ dˆ and V < Vˆ , or d¯ > dˆ and V < V˜ .
3. If uo − ub ≤ (1−θ)c1+θ and λ ≤ λˆ, it is more profitable for the retailer to integrate the offline
and online channels if and only if d¯ ≤ dˆ and V < max{Vˆ , V˜ }, or d¯ > dˆ and V < V˜ .
Theorem 3 shows that integrating the offline and online channels yields a higher total ex-
pected profit for the retailer if and only if uo− ub is large and both d¯ and V are small (Case 1),
or both uo − ub and V are small (Cases 2 and 3). Figures 7a, 7b, and 7c illustrate under what
conditions integrating the offline and online channels is beneficial for the retailer in the presence
of consumer reviews for Cases 1, 2, and 3 respectively. Similar to Figure 2 for the model without
consumer reviews, Figure 7a shows that if d¯ and V are small, it is more profitable to integrate
the offline and online channels. This is because if the two channels are operated separately, the
retailer can hardly attract the offline consumers with small base product valuation V to pur-
chase the product given a very limited product description. In contrast, integrating the offline
and online channels removes this limit.
d¯
V
0 dˆ 1
p+ uo
p+ ub + (1− θ)c
Not beneficial
Beneficial
(a) uo − ub > (1−θ)c1+θ
d¯
V
0 dˆ 1
p+ uo
p+ ub + (1− θ)c
Not beneficial
Beneficial
(b) uo − ub ≤ (1−θ)c1+θ and λ > λˆ
d¯
V
0 1
p+ uo
p+ ub + (1− θ)c
Not beneficial
Beneficial
(c) uo − ub ≤ (1−θ)c1+θ and λ ≤ λˆ
Figure 7: Region in which integrating the offline and online channels benefits the retailer
In the presence of consumer reviews, even if d¯ is large (d¯ > dˆ), it is still more profitable for
the retailer to integrate the offline and online channels as long as uo − ub is small (see Figures
7b and 7c). Note that this is different from Figure 2, where it is more profitable to integrate
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the two channels only if d¯ is small (d¯ ≤ dˆ).
If d¯ > dˆ, integrating the offline and online channels is a double-edged sword that can benefit
or hurt the retailer with consumer reviews. On the one hand, this strategy allows the offline
consumers to post and read the reviews. Since the retailer sets a high product description level
in period 1 to generate a large fraction of positive reviews λ (see Lemma 7), which increases
the offline consumers’ product valuation in period 2 and thus the retailer’s expected profit. In
contrast, integrating the offline and online channels cannot create this effect in the absence of
the consumer reviews.
On the other hand, if the offline and online channels are integrated, the retailer cannot
differentiate the product descriptions of the two channels. Since the outside option of the offline
consumers is less attractive than that of the online consumers (ub < uo), the retailer could set a
lower product description level for the offline channel. However, if the offline and online channels
are integrated, the product description level of the offline channel is increased (d†omni,1 > d
†
b,1),
which will deter some offline consumers whom the product does not fit from purchasing the
product in period 1.
Therefore, when d¯ is large (d¯ > dˆ), whether integrating the offline and online channels is
more profitable for the retailer depends on the trade-off between the retailer’s profit gain in
period 2 from the positive impact of consumer reviews and the profit loss in period 1 due to
the inflexibility of setting a common product description level for both channels. If uo − ub is
small (the difference between the outside options of the offline and online channels is small),
the retailer incurs a limited profit loss in period 1 due to the inflexibility. Consequently, it is
more profitable to integrate the offline and online channels (see Figures 7b and 7c). However,
if uo − ub is large (uo − ub > (1−θ)c1+θ ), the profit gain in period 2 from the positive impact of
consumer reviews is insufficient to compensate the profit loss in period 1 due to the inflexibility.
Thus, the retailer can be worse off by integrating the offline and online channels (see Figure 7a).
Further comparing Figures 7b and 7c, we observe that when d¯ and uo − ub are small,
integrating the offline and online channels is more dominating if λ is small (see Figure 7c). This
is intuitive because with a small λ, it is more likely for the reviews to have a positive impact
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(ψ(λ) = a(λ − λ) is more likely to be large), magnifying the benefit of integrating the offline
and online channels.
In summary, without consumer reviews, it is beneficial for the retailer to integrate the offline
and online channels only if d¯ and V are small (see Figure 2). In the presence of consumer reviews,
even if d¯ is large (d¯ > dˆ), it is still beneficial to integrate the offline and online channels when
the difference between the outside options of the two channels (uo − ub) is small (see Figures7b
and 7c).
5 Extended model with consumers searching for the product
description
If the retailer operates the offline and online channels separately, we assume that the offline
consumers cannot access the online product description. In practice, some offline consumers
may search for the online product description even if the retailer does not facilitate that (for
example, they may search using their mobile devices). In this section, we consider a model
without consumer reviews and assume that the offline consumers search for the online product
description with a probability η ∈ [0, 1]. The rest of the model is identical to that of §3.
In this extended model, the retailer chooses do,t to maximize her expected profit from both
the online consumers and the offline consumers who search for the online product description:
pio,t(do,t) = p × n × φo,t(do,t) + p × n × η × φb,t(do,t). On the other hand, the retailer chooses
db,t to maximize her expected profit from the offline consumers who do not search for the online
product description: pib,t(db,t) = p×n× (1− η)× φb,t(db,t). The following corollary summarizes
the optimal decisions of the retailer.
Corollary 2. Suppose the offline consumers search for the online product description with a
probability η. The retailer sets an offline product description level d∗b,t = 0 with an expected
profit pi∗b,t = 0 if d¯ ≤ dˆ and V < Vˆ , and sets an offline product description level d∗b,t = 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) with an expected profit pi
∗
b,t =
θ(1−η)npc
p−V+ub+c otherwise, for t = 1, 2. The retailer
sets an online product description level d∗o,t =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) with an expected profit
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pi∗o,t =
θ(1+η)npc
p−V+uo+c , for t = 1, 2.
By comparing Corollary 2 with Lemmas 1 and 2, we observe that the retailer makes identical
optimal decisions as in §3, but the total expected profits are different. Note that the retailer’s
optimal decisions and expected profits are given by Lemma 3 if the offline and online channels
are integrated. By comparing the retailer’s total expected profit when the two channels are
operated separately with that when the two channels are integrated, Corollary 3 shows the
conditions under which it is more profitable for the retailer to integrate the two channels.
Corollary 3. Suppose the offline consumers search for the online product description with a
probability η. The retailer is more profitable by integrating the offline and online channels if
and only if d¯ ≤ dˆ and V < Vˆ .
Corollary 3 shows that Theorem 1 continues to hold for this extended model.
6 Conclusion
We consider a retailer that sells a single product through an offline (brick-and-mortar) channel
and an online channel to consumers in two periods. The product has several different attributes
and the consumers are heterogeneous in their tastes (preferences) for these attributes. Each
consumer knows his own taste for each attribute, but the actual details of the product for that
attribute are unknown to him. Therefore, before purchasing the product, the consumer is unsure
about whether the product fits his taste. The consumer, however, can learn about the product
by reading the product description provided by the retailer. We study the retailer’s decisions
on the provision of the product descriptions in this multi-channel environment, and investigate
the impact of different channel-management strategies on the retailer’s expected profit.
We develop a game-theoretical model to study the decision-making process of a retailer who
either operates an offline channel and an online channel separately or in an integrated manner.
Specifically, the retailer may differentiate the product description level of the offline channel from
that of the online channel if she operates the two channels separately. In contrast, if the retailer
integrates the two channels, she sets the same product description level for both channels. In
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each period of our model, the retailer first decides the product description level(s) to maximize
her expected profit. After reading the product description, a private signal is generated for each
consumer in each channel about whether the product fits the consumer. The consumer then
evaluates his expected utility of purchasing the product conditioned on the private signal, and
decides whether to make the purchase by comparing this utility with that of an outside option.
After the consumers make their purchase decisions, the retailer’s profit is realized.
We find that it is more profitable for the retailer to integrate the offline and online channels if
and only if the limit on the offline product description d¯ is low and the consumers’ base product
valuation V is small (see Theorem 1 and Figure 2). This is because if the retailer operates the
offline and online channels separately, the offline consumers are unlikely to purchase the product
given the high product-fit uncertainty caused by the limited product description. In contrast,
by integrating the offline and online channels, the retailer can provide an identical product
description for both channels using new technology such as “cloud shelf.” A more detailed
product description makes more offline consumers willing to purchase the product, making the
retailer more profitable. This partially explains why facilitating online product descriptions in
brick-and-mortar stores becomes popular in practice.
However, the retailer needs to be cautious about integrating the offline and online channels.
Even if the offline product description limit is low, integrating the two channels does not always
benefit the retailer. Specifically, if the base product valuation V is sufficiently large, it is more
profitable to operate the two channels separately (see Figure 2). This is because when the base
product valuation is large, it is easier to attract the offline consumers who have a low utility
from the outside option. Differentiating the product description levels between the two channels
yields a higher total expected profit for the retailer. However, the retailer loses this flexibility if
she integrates the offline and online channels. Thus, it is important for the retailer to take both
the offline product description limit and the base product valuation into account when deciding
whether to integrate the offline and online channels.
We further study a model in which the consumers who purchase the product in the first
period can post their reviews about the product online through a review system. The consumers
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in the second period can read these reviews before they decide whether to purchase the product.
If the retailer operates the offline and online channels separately, only the online consumers can
post and read the reviews, while both the offline and online consumers can post and read the
reviews if the retailer integrates the two channels. We analyze the equilibrium outcomes and
investigate the implications of adding such a review system.
In the presence of consumer reviews, even if the offline product description limit d¯ is high,
it may still be beneficial for the retailer to integrate the offline and online channels as long as
the outside-option utility difference between the two channels uo − ub is small (see Figures 7b
and 7c). In this situation, integrating the offline and online channels is a double-edged sword
that can benefit or hurt the retailer. On the one hand, it allows the offline consumers to post
and read the reviews. Since the retailer provides a sufficiently rich product description in the
first period to generate a large fraction of positive reviews (see Lemma 7), these reviews can
increase the offline consumers’ product valuation in the second period, and thus increase the
retailer’s expected profit. On the other hand, the retailer sets the same product description
level for both channels. The higher product description level in the first period (d†omni,1 > d
†
b,1)
can deter some offline consumers whom the product does not fit from purchasing the product.
Therefore, if d¯ is large, whether integrating the two channels is more profitable for the
retailer depends on the trade-off between the profit gain in period 2 from the consumer reviews’
positive impact and the profit loss in period 1 due to the inflexibility of setting the same product
description level for both channels. If uo − ub is small, the retailer incurs a limited profit loss
in period 1 due to the product description inflexibility. Consequently, it is more profitable to
integrate the offline and online channels (see Figures 7b and 7c). However, if uo − ub is large,
the profit gain in period 2 from the positive impact of the consumer reviews is insufficient
to compensate the profit loss due to the inflexibility. Thus, the retailer can be worse off by
integrating the two channels (see Figure 7a).
We also find that the consumer reviews may hurt the retailer’s profit if the consumers’ base
product valuation V is sufficiently large (see Theorem 2 and Corollary 1). This is because
when there are no reviews, the retailer can already attract the consumers with large base
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product valuation easily even with a low product description level. In the presence of consumer
reviews, however, the retailer has to set a high product description level in period 1 to prevent
the negative impact of the reviews on the upcoming consumers. The increase in the product
description level drives down the retailer’s profit in period 1 as it prevents some consumers
whom the product does not fit from purchasing the product. This is detrimental to the retailer.
Finally, it is worth noting that understanding how consumer reviews affect future purchases
is not straightforward in practice. For example, some retailers allow consumers to rate a product
in multiple dimensions. These multi-dimensional ratings may reflect how the product fits the
consumers’ tastes, and may help future consumers figure out whether the product fits them.
Investigating the effects of such reviews can be an interesting direction for future work.
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Online supplement
Recall that we make the following assumptions in the paper:
Assumption 1. If pii,t(d
′
i,t) = pii,t(d
′′
i,t) and d
′
i,t < d
′′
i,t, then the retailer always chooses d
′
i,t.
Assumption 2. p+ uo ≤ V < p+ ub + (1− θ)c.
Assumption 3. (1− θ)c/2 < uo − ub < min{θc, (1− θ)c}.
Assumption 4. θ + (1−θ)ca < λ < 1− (1−θ)ca and a > 2c/θ2.
Given the probabilities P{m} and P{s|m}, we can derive the probability distribution of s as
P{s = 0} = 1− (1− θ)di,t and P{s = 1} = (1− θ)di,t, according to Bayes’ Theorem.
Proof of Lemma 1. In the model without consumer reviews, the retailer decides a product de-
scription level db,t for the offline channel. The consumers with perceived signal s = 1 will never
purchase the product according to Equation (1) and Assumption 2. The consumers with per-
ceived signal s = 0 purchase the product if E[U |s = 0] ≥ ub, i.e., V − c(1−θ)(1−db,t)1−(1−θ)db,t − p ≥ ub,
according to Equation (1). By solving this inequality for db,t, we obtain that db,t ≥ 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) , under which these consumers with perceived signal s = 0 will purchase the
product. Note that the retailer can only choose a db,t ≤ d¯ < 1, thus,
1. if 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) ≤ d¯, then the retailer can attract the consumers with perceived
signal s = 0 to purchase the product by choosing a db,t ∈ [ 11−θ + θc(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) , d¯], or not
attract these consumers to purchase the product by choosing a db,t <
1
1−θ+
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c)
which will reuslt in zero profit and always be dominated by the former choice. Thus the
latter is omitted in the following discussions.
2. if 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) > d¯, then the retailer can never attract the consumers with
perceived signal s = 0 to purchase the product.
By solving the above inequalities for V , under Assumption 2, we obtain the following cases:
1. if V ≥ p + ub + (1−θ)(1−d¯)c1−(1−θ)d¯ = Vˆ and d¯ ≤
(1−θ)c−(uo−ub)
(1−θ)[c−(uo−ub)] = dˆ, or d¯ > dˆ, the retailer can
attract the consumers with perceived signal s = 0 to purchase the product by choosing a
db,t ∈ [ 11−θ + θc(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) , d¯], and generate a profit pib,t(db,t) = p×n× (1− (1− θ)db,t).
One can see that pib,t(db,t) decreases in db,t, so it is optimal for the retailer to choose d
∗
b,t =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) to maximize her profit. By substituting d
∗
b,t =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c)
into pib,t(db,t), we obtain that pi
∗
b,t =
θnpc
p−V+ub+c .
2. if V < Vˆ and d¯ ≤ dˆ, the retailer can never attract the consumers with perceived signal
s = 0 to purchase the product, which means pib,t(db,t) = 0. Thus, according to Assumption
1, the retailer is optimal to choose d∗b,t = 0 with pi
∗
b,t = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. In the model without consumer reviews, the retailer decides a product de-
scription level do,t for the online channel. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we can obtain that
the consumers with perceived signal s = 1 will never purchase the product, and the consumers
with s = 0 will purchase the product if do,t ≥ 11−θ + θc(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) . The retailer can at-
tract these consumers with perceived signal s = 0 to purchase the product by choosing a do,t ≥
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1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) and generate a profit pio,t(do,t) = p×n×(1−(1−θ)do,t). One can see that
pio,t(do,t) decreases in do,t, so it is optimal for the retailer to choose d
∗
o,t =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c)
to maximize her profit. By substituting d∗o,t =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) into pio,t(do,t), we obtain
that pi∗o,t =
θnpc
p−V+uo+c .
Proof of Lemma 3. In the model without consumer reviews, the retailer decides a product de-
scription level domni,t for both channels. The offline consumers will purchase the product if
E[U |s] ≥ ub and online consumers will purchase the product if E[U |s] ≥ uo, where E[U |s] is de-
rived in Equation (1). Similar to the proofs of Lemma 1 and 2, we can obtain that the consumers
with perceived signal s = 1 will never purchase the product, the offline consumers with perceived
signal s = 0 will purchase the product if domni,t ≥ 11−θ + θc(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) , and the online con-
sumers with perceived signal s = 0 will purchase the product if domni,t ≥ 11−θ + θc(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) .
According to Assumption 3, we can obtain 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) >
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) . The
optimal choice of the retailer is among the following two:
1. attract both the offline and online consumers with perceived signal s = 0 to purchase the
product by choosing a domni,t ≥ 11−θ + θc(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) , and generate a profit
piomni,t(domni,t) = p× (n× φb,t(domni,t) + n× φo,t(domni,t))
= p× (n× P{s = 0}+ n× P{s = 0})
= 2pn(1− (1− θ)domni,t).
(3)
One can see that piomni,t(domni,t) decreases in domni,t, so it is optimal for the retailer to
choose d∗omni,t =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) to maximize her profit. By substituting d
∗
omni,t =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) into Equation (3), we obtain that pi
∗
omni,t =
2θnpc
p−V+uo+c .
2. attract the offline consumers with perceived signal s = 0 to purchase the product by
choosing a domni,t ∈ [ 11−θ + θc(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) ,
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c)), and generate a profit
piomni,t(domni,t) = p× (n× φb,t(domni,t) + n× φo,t(domni,t))
= p× n× P{s = 0}
= pn(1− (1− θ)domni,t).
(4)
One can see that piomni,t(domni,t) decreases in domni,t, so it is optimal for the retailer to
choose d∗omni,t =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) to maximize her profit. By substituting d
∗
omni,t =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) into Equation (4), we obtain that pi
∗
omni,t =
θnpc
p−V+ub+c .
By comparing the optimal profits of the retailer under choices 1 and 2, we can obtain that
2θnpc
p−V+uo+c >
θnpc
p−V+ub+c according to assumptions 2 and 3. Thus choice 1 is optimal for the
retailer, that is d∗omni,t =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) and pi
∗
omni,t =
2θnpc
p−V+uo+c .
Proof of Theorem 1. According to Lemmas 1 and 2, we determine the optimal profit of the
retailer who operates the offline and online channels separately pi∗dual,t = pi
∗
b,t + pi
∗
o,t as follows.
1. pi∗dual,t =
θnpc
p−V+uo+c if d¯ ≤ dˆ and V ≥ Vˆ .
2. pi∗dual,t =
θnpc
p−V+uo+c +
θnpc
p−V+ub+c otherwise.
According to Lemma 3, the optimal profit of the retailer who integrates the offline and online
channels is pi∗omni,t =
2θnpc
p−V+uo+c . One can see that pi
∗
omni,t > pi
∗
dual,t if d¯ ≤ dˆ and V ≥ Vˆ .
Otherwise, according to Assumption 3, we can prove that pi∗omni,t < pi
∗
dual,t.
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Proof of Lemma 4. In the model with consumer reviews, the retailer decides a product de-
scription level do,2 in period 2 for the online channel. According to Equation (2), period
2 consumers with perceived signal s = 0 purchase the product if E[U |s = 0] ≥ uo, i.e.,
V − c(1−θ)(1−do,2)1−(1−θ)do,2 +ψ(λ)− p ≥ uo, and period 2 consumers with perceived signal s = 1 purchase
the product if E[U |s = 1] ≥ uo, i.e., V − c + ψ(λ) − p ≥ uo. Solving these two inequalities for
V and do,2, we obtain the following cases:
1. if V ≥ p + uo + (1 − θ)c − ψ(λ), the retailer can attract all the period 2 consumers to
purchase the product by choosing any do,2. In this case, pio,2(do,2) = p× n, so it’s optimal
for the retailer to choose d†o,2 = 0 with pi
†
o,2 = pn.
2. if p + uo − ψ(λ) ≤ V < p + uo + (1 − θ)c − ψ(λ), the retailer can attract the pe-
riod 2 consumers with perceived signal s = 0 to purchase the product by choosing a
do,2 ≥ 11−θ + θc(1−θ)(V+ψ(λ)−p−uo−c) , and generate a profit pio,2(do,2) = pn(1 − (1 − θ)do,2).
One can see that pio,2(do,2) decreases in do,2, so it is optimal for the retailer to choose
d†o,2 =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V+ψ(λ)−p−uo−c) to maximize her profit. By substituting d
†
o,2 =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V+ψ(λ)−p−uo−c) into pio,2(do,2) , we obtain that pi
†
o,2 =
θnpc
p−V+uo+c−ψ(λ) .
3. if V < p+uo−ψ(λ), the retailer can never attract any period 2 consumer to purchase the
product which means pio,2(do,2) = 0. Thus it’s optimal for the retailer to choose d
†
o,2 = 0
with pi†o,2 = 0.
Combining Assumption 2 and the conditions of V in the above 3 cases, we can obtain the results
in Lemma 4 accordingly.
Proof of Lemma 5. In the model with consumer reviews, the retailer decides a product descrip-
tion level do,1 in period 1 for the online channel. The period 1 consumers with perceived signal
s = 1 will never purchase the product according to Assumption 2. The period 1 consumers with
perceived signal s = 0 purchase the product if E[U |s = 0] ≥ uo, i.e., V − c(1−θ)(1−do,1)1−(1−θ)do,1 − p ≥ uo.
By solving this inequality for do,1, we obtain that do,1 ≥ 11−θ + θc(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) . Thus the retailer
has two choices in period 1: not attract period 1 consumers to purchase the product by choosing
a do,1 <
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) ; or attract period 1 consumers with perceived signal s = 0 to
purchase the product by choosing a do,1 ≥ 11−θ + θc(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) .
We first analyze the case that do,1 <
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) , in which the profit is pio,1(do,1) =
0 in period 1. In this case, no consumer review is generated so the expected impact of consumer
reviews on period 2 consumers is ψ(λ) = 0. Thus, in period 2, the consumers have the same
expected utilities as that in the model without consumer reviews, and the retailer will make the
same optimal decisions as that in the model without consumer reviews. According to Lemma
2, it is optimal for the retailer to choose d†o,2 =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) in period 2 with a profit
pi†o,2 =
θnpc
p−V+uo+c . In this case, Πo = pio,1(do,1) + pi
†
o,2 =
θnpc
p−V+uo+c , which is independent of do,1.
Thus it’s optimal for the retailer to choose d†o,1 = 0 with Π
†
o =
θnpc
p−V+uo+c .
We then analyze the case that do,1 ≥ 11−θ + θc(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) . In this case, period 1 consumers
with perceived signal s = 0 will purchase the product, and the retailer generate a profit in period
1 as follows:
pio,1(do,1) = p× n× φo,1(do,1)
= p× n× P{s = 0}
= pn(1− (1− θ)do,1).
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The actual misfit degree m of these period 1 consumers who purchase the product has the
following distributions:
P{m = 0|s = 0} = P{s=0|m=0}P{m=0}P{s=0} = θ1−(1−θ)do,1 ,
P{m = 1|s = 0} = P{s=0|m=1}P{m=1}P{s=0} =
(1−θ)(1−do,1)
1−(1−θ)do,1 .
With probability η, the period 1 consumers with U = V −p−cm ≥ uo will write positive reviews,
and the period 1 consumers with U = V −p−cm < uo will write negative reviews. According to
Assumption 2, these two inequalities indicate that with probability η, the period 1 consumers
with m = 0 will write positive reviews, while the consumers with m = 1 will write negative
reviews. Thus, the expected number of positive consumer reviews is η×n×P{s = 0}×P{m =
0|s = 0} = ηθn and the expected number of negative consumer reviews is η × n × P{s =
0}×P{m = 1|s = 0} = η(1−θ)(1−do,1)n, so the expected fraction of positive consumer reviews
among all the consumer reviews is λ = ηθnηθn+η(1−θ)(1−do,1)n =
θ
1−(1−θ)do,1 , and the expected impact
of consumer reviews on period 2 consumers is ψ(λ) = a(λ−λ) = a
(
θ
1−(1−θ)do,1 − λ
)
. According
to Lemma 4, we have the following three cases.
1. pi†o,2 = 0 if ψ(λ) ≤ uo−ub−(1−θ)c, or uo−ub−(1−θ)c < ψ(λ) < 0 and V < p+uo−ψ(λ).
Substituting ψ(λ) into these inequalities and solve them for do,1, we can obtain do,1 <
1
1−θ +
θa
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−aλ) . In this case, Πo = pio,1(do,1) + pi
†
o,2 = pn(1− (1− θ)do,1).
2. pi†o,2 =
θnpc
p−V+uo+c−ψ(λ) if uo−ub−(1−θ)c < ψ(λ) < 0 and V ≥ p+uo−ψ(λ), or 0 ≤ ψ(λ) ≤
uo−ub, or uo−ub < ψ(λ) < (1− θ)c and V < p+uo + (1− θ)c−ψ(λ). Substituting ψ(λ)
into these inequalities and solve them for do,1, we can obtain
1
1−θ +
θa
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−aλ) ≤
do,1 <
1
1−θ +
θa
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−(1−θ)c−aλ) . In this case, Πo = pio,1(do,1) + pi
†
o,2 = pn(1 − (1 −
θ)do,1) +
θnpc
p−V+uo+c−ψ(λ) = pn(1− (1− θ)do,1) +
(1−(1−θ)do,1)θnpc
(1−(1−θ)do,1)(aλ+p−V+uo+c)−θa .
3. pi†o,2 = pn if uo−ub < ψ(λ) < (1−θ)c and V ≥ p+uo+(1−θ)c−ψ(λ), or ψ(λ) ≥ (1−θ)c.
Substituting ψ(λ) into these inequalities and solve them for do,1, we can obtain do,1 ≥
1
1−θ +
θa
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−(1−θ)c−aλ) . In this case, Πo = pio,1(do,1)+pi
†
o,2 = pn(1−(1−θ)do,1)+pn.
Since do,1 ≥ 11−θ + θc(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) , the above three cases may or may not happen depending
on their corresponding conditions of do,1. Specifically,
(1) if 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) ≤ 11−θ + θa(1−θ)(V−p−uo−aλ) , which can be rewritten as V ≥ p+uo +
(1− θ)c− c(a(λ−θ)−(1−θ)c)a−c , the optimal choice of the retailer is among the following three:
(i) choose a do,1 ∈ [ 11−θ + θc(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) , 11−θ + θa(1−θ)(V−p−uo−aλ)) which satisfies the
condition in the above case 1, with a profit Πo = pn(1 − (1 − θ)do,1). One can see
that Πo decreases in do,1, so it is optimal for the retailer to choose d
†
o,1 =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) to maximize her profit. In this case, Π
†
o =
θnpc
p−V+uo+c .
(ii) choose a do,1 ∈ [ 11−θ + θa(1−θ)(V−p−uo−aλ) , 11−θ + θa(1−θ)(V−p−uo−(1−θ)c−aλ)) which sat-
isfies the condition in the above case 2, with a profit Πo = pn(1 − (1 − θ)do,1) +
(1−(1−θ)do,1)θnpc
(1−(1−θ)do,1)(aλ+p−V+uo+c)−θa . According to Assumption 4, we can prove that Πo in-
creases in do,1, so it is optimal for the retailer to choose d
†
o,1 =
1
1−θ+
θa
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−(1−θ)c−aλ)
to maximize her profit. In this case, Π†o = θnpap−V+uo+(1−θ)c+aλ + pn.
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(iii) choose a do,1 ∈ [ 11−θ + θa(1−θ)(V−p−uo−(1−θ)c−aλ) , 1] which satisfies the condition in the
above case 3, with a profit Πo = pn(1−(1−θ)do,1)+pn. One can see that Πo decreases
in do,1, so it is optimal for the retailer to choose d
†
o,1 =
1
1−θ +
θa
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−(1−θ)c−aλ)
to maximize her profit. In this case, Π†o = θnpap−V+uo+(1−θ)c+aλ + pn.
Comparing the above optimal profits Π†o of the retailer under the above 3 choices, we
can prove that θnpap−V+uo+(1−θ)c+aλ + np >
θnpc
p−V+uo+c according to Assumption 4. Thus
choice(iii) is optimal for the retailer, that is d†o,1 =
1
1−θ +
θa
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−(1−θ)c−aλ) and
Π†o = θnpap−V+uo+(1−θ)c+aλ + pn.
Recall that the optimal profit in the above case that do,1 <
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) is
Π†o = θnpcp−V+uo+c . According to Assumption 4, we can prove that
θnpa
p−V+uo+(1−θ)c+aλ + pn >
θnpc
p−V+uo+c . Therefore, the case that do,1 <
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) is always dominated by
the current case and thus omitted.
(2) if 11−θ +
θa
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−aλ) <
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) ≤ 11−θ + θa(1−θ)(V−p−uo−(1−θ)c−aλ) , which
can be rewritten as p+ uo + (1− θ)c− ca(λ−θ)a−c ≤ V < p+ uo + (1− θ)c− c(a(λ−θ)−(1−θ)c)a−c ,
the optimal choice of the retailer is among the following two:
(i) choose a do,1 ∈ [ 11−θ + θc(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) , 11−θ + θa(1−θ)(V−p−uo−(1−θ)c−aλ)) which satis-
fies the condition in the above case 2, with a profit Πo = pn(1 − (1 − θ)do,1) +
(1−(1−θ)do,1)θnpc
(1−(1−θ)do,1)(aλ+p−V+uo+c)−θa . According to Assumption 4, we can prove that Πo in-
creases in do,1, so it is optimal for the retailer to choose d
†
o,1 =
1
1−θ+
θa
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−(1−θ)c−aλ)
to maximize her profit. In this case, Π†o = θnpap−V+uo+(1−θ)c+aλ + pn.
(ii) choose a do,1 ∈ [ 11−θ + θa(1−θ)(V−p−uo−(1−θ)c−aλ) , 1] which satisfies the condition in the
above case 3, with a profit Πo = pn(1−(1−θ)do,1)+pn. One can see that Πo decreases
in do,1, so it is optimal for the retailer to choose d
†
o,1 =
1
1−θ +
θa
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−(1−θ)c−aλ)
to maximize her profit. In this case, Π†o = θnpap−V+uo+(1−θ)c+aλ + pn.
Note that the optimal description level d†o,1 and profit Π
†
o are the same under the above
two choices, that is d†o,1 =
1
1−θ +
θa
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−(1−θ)c−aλ) and Π
†
o =
θnpa
p−V+uo+(1−θ)c+aλ +pn.
(3) if 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) >
1
1−θ +
θa
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−(1−θ)c−aλ) , which can be rewritten as V <
p + uo + (1 − θ)c − ca(λ−θ)a−c , the optimal choice of the retailer is choosing a do,1 ∈ [ 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) , 1] which satisfies the condition in the above case 3, with a profit Πo =
pn(1 − (1 − θ)do,1) + pn. One can see that Πo decreases in do,1, so it is optimal for
the retailer to choose d†o,1 =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) to maximize her profit. In this case,
Π†o = θnpcp−V+uo+c + pn.
In summary, the retailer’s optimal decision d†o,1 and profit Π
†
o are as follows:
1. If V ≥ p + uo + (1 − θ)c − ca(λ−θ)a−c = V¯1, then d†o,1 = 11−θ + θa(1−θ)(V−p−uo−(1−θ)c−aλ) and
Π†o = θnpap−V+uo+(1−θ)c+aλ + pn.
2. If V < V¯1, then d
†
o,1 =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) and Π
†
o =
θnpc
p−V+uo+c + pn.
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Combining Assumption 2 and the conditions of V in that case, we can obtain the results in
Lemma 5 accordingly.
Proof of Theorem 2. According to Lemma 2, we can determine the optimal online total profit of
the retailer who operates the offline and online channels separately over the two periods under
the model without consumer reviews as Π∗o = pi∗o,1 + pi∗o,2 =
2θnpc
p−V+uo+c . Comparing it with Π
†
o in
Lemma 5, we find that
1. if λ ≥ λ¯ and V ≥ V¯1, Π†o = θnpap−V+uo+(1−θ)c+aλ+pn. By solving
2θnpc
p−V+uo+c <
θnpa
p−V+uo+(1−θ)c+aλ+
pn for V , we obtain that V < p+ uo + (1− θ)c− θc−a(θ+λ)+
√
(a(θ+λ)−θc)2+4θca(λ−θ)
2 = V¯2.
Thus, Π∗o < Π
†
o if V < V¯2, and Π
∗
o ≥ Π†o otherwise.
2. if λ ≥ λ¯ and V < V¯1, or λ < λ¯, Π†o = θnpcp−V+uo+c + pn. According to Assumption 2, we
have θnpcp−V+uo+c < pn, and thus Π
∗
o < Π
†
o.
Note that V¯2 > V¯1, so Theorem 2 follows.
Proof of Lemma 6. In the model with consumer reviews, the retailer decides a product descrip-
tion level domni,2 for both channels in period 2. The period 2 offline consumers will purchase the
product if E[U |s] ≥ ub and period 2 online consumers will purchase the product if E[U |s] ≥ uo,
where E[U |s] is derived in Equation (2). Similar to the proofs of Lemma 4, by solving these
inequalities for V , we can determine the conditions under which different types of consumers
will purchase the product, and obtain the following cases:
1. if V ≥ p + uo + (1 − θ)c − ψ(λ), the retailer can attract the period 2 offline consumers
with perceived signal s = 0 and period 2 online consumers with perceived signal s = 0 to
purchase the product by choosing any domni,2. In this case, the retailer’s profit is
piomni,2(domni,2) = p× (n× φb,2(domni,2) + n× φo,2(domni,2))
= p× (n× P{s = 0}+ n× P{s = 0})
= 2pn(1− (1− θ)domni,2).
One can see that piomni,2(domni,2) decreases in domni,2, so it is optimal for the retailer to
choose d†omni,2 = 0 to maximize her profit. In this case, pi
†
omni,2 = 2pn.
2. if p+uo−ψ(λ) ≤ V < p+uo+ (1− θ)c−ψ(λ), the optimal choice of the retailer is among
the following two:
(a) attract both the period 2 offline consumers with perceived signal s = 0 and the period
2 online consumers with perceived signal s = 0 to purchase the product by choosing
a domni,2 ≥ 11−θ + θc(1−θ)(V+ψ(λ)−p−uo−c) , and generate a profit
piomni,2(domni,2) = p× (n× φb,2(domni,2) + n× φo,2(domni,2))
= p× (n× P{s = 0}+ n× P{s = 0})
= 2pn(1− (1− θ)domni,2).
One can see that piomni,2(domni,2) decreases in domni,2, so it is optimal for the retailer
to choose d†omni,2 =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V+ψ(λ)−p−uo−c) to maximize her profit. In this case,
pi†omni,2 =
2θnpc
p−V+uo+c−ψ(λ) .
(b) attract the period 2 offline consumers with perceived signal s = 0 to purchase the
product by choosing a domni,2 ∈ [ 11−θ+ θc(1−θ)(V+ψ(λ)−p−ub−c) ,
1
1−θ+
θc
(1−θ)(V+ψ(λ)−p−uo−c)),
and generate a profit
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piomni,2(domni,2) = p× (n× φb,2(domni,2) + n× φo,2(domni,2))
= p× n× P{s = 0}
= pn(1− (1− θ)domni,2).
One can see that piomni,2(domni,2) decreases in domni,2, so it is optimal for the retailer
to choose d†omni,2 =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V+ψ(λ)−p−ub−c) to maximize her profit. In this case,
pi†omni,2 =
θnpc
p−V+ub+c−ψ(λ) .
Comparing the optimal profits of the retailer under choices (a) and (b), we can prove
that 2θnpcp−V+uo+c−ψ(λ) >
θnpc
p−V+ub+c−ψ(λ) according to assumptions 2 and 3. Thus choice (a)
is optimal for the retailer in this case, that is d†omni,2 =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V+ψ(λ)−p−uo−c) and
pi†omni,2 =
2θnpc
p−V+uo+c−ψ(λ) .
3. if p+ ub − ψ(λ) ≤ V < p+ uo − ψ(λ), the optimal choice of the retailer is attracting the
period 2 offline consumers with perceived signal s = 0 to purchase the product by choosing
a domni,2 ∈ [ 11−θ + θc(1−θ)(V+ψ(λ)−p−ub−c) ,
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V+ψ(λ)−p−uo−c)), and generate a profit
piomni,2(domni,2) = p× (n× φb,2(domni,2) + n× φo,2(domni,2))
= p× n× P{s = 0}
= pn(1− (1− θ)domni,2).
One can see that piomni,2(domni,2) decreases in domni,2, so it is optimal for the retailer
to choose d†omni,2 =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V+ψ(λ)−p−ub−c) to maximize her profit. In this case,
pi†omni,2 =
θnpc
p−V+ub+c−ψ(λ) .
4. if V < p+ub−ψ(λ), the retailer can never attract any period 2 consumer to purchase the
product which means piomni,2(domni,2) = 0. Thus, it’s optimal for the retailer to choose
d†omni,2 = 0 with pi
†
omni,2 = 0.
Combining Assumption 2 and the conditions of V in the above 4 cases, we can obtain the results
in Lemma 6 accordingly.
Proof of Lemma 7. In the model with consumer reviews, the retailer decides a product descrip-
tion level domni,1 for both channels in period 1. The period 1 offline consumers will purchase
the product if E[U |s] ≥ ub and the period 1 online consumers will purchase the product if
E[U |s] ≥ uo. Similar to the proofs of Lemma 5, by solving these inequalities for domni,1, we can
determine the conditions under which different types of consumers will purchase the product,
and obtain that the optimal choice of the retailer is among the following three:
1. attract both the period 1 online consumers with perceived signal s = 0 and the period
1 offline consumers with perceived signal s = 0 to purchase the product by choosing
a domni,1 ≥ 11−θ + θc(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) . Similar to the proof of Lemma 5, by considering the
expected impact of consumer reviews on period 2 consumers and the optimal profit pi†omni,2
the retailer can generate in period 2, we can determine the retailer’s optimal decision and
profit in period 1 under this choice as follows:
(a) If V ≥ p+uo + (1− θ)c− ca(λ−θ)a−c = V¯1, then d†omni,1 = 11−θ + θa(1−θ)(V−p−uo−(1−θ)c−aλ)
and Π†omni =
2θnpa
p−V+uo+(1−θ)c+aλ + 2pn.
(b) If V < V¯1, then d
†
omni,1 =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) and Π
†
omni =
2θnpc
p−V+uo+c + 2pn.
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2. attract the period 1 offline consumers with perceived signal s = 0 to purchase the product
by choosing a domni,1 ∈ [ 11−θ + θc(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) ,
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c)). Similar to the
proof of Lemma 5, by considering the expected impact of consumer reviews on period 2
consumers and the optimal profit pi†omni,2 the retailer can generate in period 2, we can
determine the retailer’s optimal decision and profit in period 1 under this choice. It turns
out that the optimal profits under this choice are no larger than the profits under the
above choice 1, which means that this choice 2 is dominated by the above choice 1, and
thus not optimal.
3. not attract period 1 consumers to purchase the product by choosing a domni,1 <
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) , with a profit piomni,1(domni,1) = 0 in period 1. Under this choice, no
consumer review is generated so the expected impact of consumer reviews on period 2
consumers is ψ(λ) = 0. Thus, in period 2, the consumers have the same expected utilities
as that in the model without consumer reviews, and the retailer will make the same
optimal decisions as that in the model without consumer reviews. According to Lemma
3, it is optimal for the retailer to choose d†omni,2 =
1
1−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) in period 2 with
a profit pi†omni,2 =
2θnpc
p−V+uo+c . Therefore, Πomni = piomni,1(domni,1) + pi
†
omni,2 =
2θnpc
p−V+uo+c ,
which is independent of do,1. Thus, it’s optimal for the retailer to choose d
†
omni,1 = 0 with
Π†omni =
2θnpc
p−V+uo+c . It is easy to see that this profit is less than the optimal profits of the
retailer under choice 1, which means that this choice 3 is dominated by the above choice
1 and thus not optimal.
In conclusion, the results under the above choice 1 are optimal. Combining Assumption 2 and
the conditions of V in that choice, we can obtain the results in Lemma 7 accordingly.
Proof of Corollary 1. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2 and thus omitted.
Proof of Theorem 3. According to Lemmas 1 and 5, we can determine the optimal total profit
of the retailer who operates the offline and online channels separately over 2 periods Π†dual =
pi∗b,1 + pi
∗
b,2 + Π
†
o as follows.
1. Π†dual =
θnpc
p−V+uo+c + np if d¯ ≤ dˆ, λ > λˆ, and V < V¯1; or d¯ ≤ dˆ, λ ≤ λˆ, and V < Vˆ .
2. Π†dual =
θnpa
aλ+p−V+uo+(1−θ)c + np if d¯ ≤ dˆ, λ > λˆ, and V¯1 ≤ V < Vˆ .
3. Π†dual =
2θnpc
p−V+ub+c +
θnpa
aλ+p−V+uo+(1−θ)c + np if d¯ ≤ dˆ, λ > λˆ, and V ≥ Vˆ ; or d¯ ≤ dˆ,
λ¯ ≤ λ ≤ λˆ, and V ≥ V¯1; or d¯ > dˆ, λ > λ¯, and V ≥ V¯1.
4. Π†dual =
2θnpc
p−V+ub+c +
θnpc
p−V+uo+c + np if d¯ ≤ dˆ, λ¯ ≤ λ ≤ λˆ, and Vˆ ≤ V < V¯1; or d¯ ≤ dˆ,
λ ≤ λ¯, and V ≥ Vˆ ; or d¯ > dˆ, λ > λ¯, and V < V¯1; or d¯ > dˆ and λ ≤ λ¯.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, by comparing Π†dual with Π
†
omni in Lemma 7 in each cases,
we can obtain the results in Theorem 3.
Proof of Corollary 2. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemmas 1 and 2, and thus omitted.
Proof of Corollary 3. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 and thus omitted.
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